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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is a response to an appeal by the appellant, James 
Cassidy, from a judgment of the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County, dismissing his complaint seeking a review of a decision 
of the Salt Lake County Fire Civil Service Council, hereinafter 
referred to as "F.C.S.C." The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over such appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2a-3(b)(i) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Salt Lake County Fire Chief is a necessary 
and indispensable party to the claim that James Cassidy suffered 
a nonpromotion as a result of his right of free speech. 
Issues involving questions of law are reviewed under a 
correction of error standard- An appellate court reviews for 
correctness. In Re J.P.M., 810 P.2d 494 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Whether the failure to marshal the evidence in support 
of the lower court's decision requires this Court to assume the 
record supports the findings. 
An appellate court reviews under the substantial evidence 
standard viewed in light of the whole record before the Court. 
Stewart v. Bd. of Review, 831 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. Whether the appellant suffered an adverse employment 
action resulting from his right of free speech. 
This issue contains mixed law and facts which requires a 
deferential clear error standard, with the "legal effect . . . in 
the province of the appellate courts," . . . However, policy 
considerations and other factors may . . . grant some operational 
discretion to the trial courts . . . ." Drake v. Indus, Comm'n. 
of Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997); Lanaeland v. Monarch Motors, 
Inc., 307 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1996). 
4. Whether the appellant's speech was constitutionally 
protected and was he denied a promotion even in the absence of 
protected conduct. 
Issues of mixed law and facts which require a deferential 
clear error standard, with the "legal effect . . . in the 
province of the appellate courts, . . . Nevertheless, . . . 
policy considerations and other factors may lend this court to 
define a legal standard so that it actually . . . grant[s] some 
operational discretion to the trial courts applying it." Drake 
at 181. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Rules 19(a) and 19(b) of the Utah R. of Civ. P. 
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just 
adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A 
person who is subject to service of process 
and whose joinder will not deprive the court 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
action shall be joined as a party in the 
action if (1) in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) he claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is 
so situated that the disposition of the 
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action in his absence may (i) as a practical 
matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of 
the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest. If he has not been so joined, the 
court shall order that he be made a party. 
If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses 
to do sor he may be made a defendant, or in a 
proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If 
the joined party objects to venue and his 
joinder would render the venue of the action 
improper, he shall be dismissed from the 
action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever 
joinder not feasible. If a person as 
described in Subdivision (a) (l)-(2) hereof 
cannot be made a party, the court shall 
determine whether in equity and good 
conscience the action should proceed among 
the parties before it, or should be 
dismissed, the absent person being thus 
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be 
considered by the court include: first, to 
what extent a judgment rendered in the 
person's absence might be prejudicial to him 
or those already parties; second, the extent 
to which, by protective provisions in the 
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other 
measure, the prejudice can be lessened or 
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered 
in the person's absence will be adequate; 
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an 
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed 
for non-joinder. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 17-28-8: 
The fire chief of each fire department 
of counties subject to the provisions of this 
chapter shall, subject to the rules of the 
County Fire Civil Service Council, appoint 
from the certified county fire civil service 
register, all persons necessary to fill all 
firefighters civil service positions in 
county fire department. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of the decision of the Salt Lake County 
Fire Chief not to promote the appellant to the position of 
station captain, 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On November 22, 1992, the appellant, James Cassidy 
(hereinafter "Cassidy"), filed a grievance with the Salt Lake 
County Fire Civil Service Council alleging that Salt Lake County 
Fire Chief Larry Hinman's failure to promote him to captain was 
in violation of his statutory and constitutional rights. On 
April 23, 1993, the Council ruled it lacked the authority to hear 
Cassidy's grievance. On October 31, 1994, Judge Timothy R. 
Hanson ordered the F.C.S.C. to reconsider its ruling and render a 
decision. Pursuant to the order of Judge Hanson, the F.C.S.C. 
entered its findings and decision against Mr. Cassidy on 
April 11, 1995. 
Mr. Cassidy filed this action in the Third District Court on 
May 11, 1995, alleging his right of free speech was violated by 
the fire department for its failure to promote him to captain. 
The District Court granted the F.C.S.C.'s motion to limit the 
court's review to the record before the Fire Civil Service 
Council, determine questions of both law and fact, and affirm, 
set aside or modify the decision of the Fire Civil Service 
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Council. On July 31, 1997, following briefing and arguments by 
the parties, the District Court granted judgment for the 
F.C.S.C.1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On August 1, 1982, Mr. Cassidy was hired as a Salt Lake 
County Firefighter. R. 37, 11. 
2. In October of 1990, he filed a grievance challenging 
the change of procedure in dealing with minor violations of the 
Uniform Fire Code. R. 180. Mr. Cassidy's first free speech 
claim. 
3. His grievance was denied by his captain, Scott Collins; 
the Fire Chief, Larry Hinman; and the F.C.S.C. R. 181, 183, 192-
194. 
4. In the fall of 1991, Mr. Cassidy met with Deputy Fire 
Chief Don Berry and Fire Chief Larry Hinman and was told that he 
would not be passed over for promotions if he met certain 
conditions. Transcript of hearing before the Salt Lake County 
Fire Civil Service Council (hereinafter "Transcript")2 at page 
201 (hereafter xxp" for page and "1" for lines) . 
5. In February of 1992, a promotional register was created 
for the position of captain. Candidates one, two, three, and six 
See the attached findings and decision of the lower court. 
References herein to "Transcript'' refer to the transcript of the 
hearing before the Fire Civil Service Council, which is included in the record 
in a separate volume. 
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were selected for promotion to captain. Transcript, p. 160, 
1. 19-23. 
6. In the spring of 1992, the fire department announced 
the formation of the wildland fire crew. Transcript, p. 160. 
The wildland fire crew would allow the fire department to hire 
and train part-time firefighters to fight brush fires, and allow 
the full-time firefighters of the department to concentrate on 
structural fires or fires where lives and property are 
threatened. Transcript, p. 190, 1. 1-10. 
7. Mr. Cassidy complained to his captain and other crew 
members that the wildland fire crew was illegal. Transcript, p. 
238, 1. 1-15. 
8. In the spring of 1992, he met with Deputy Chief Don 
Berry and told him that if the department went ahead with the 
wildland fire crew, he was going to take action to see that the 
department didn't hire those people. Transcript 197, 1. 4-8. 
Mr. Cassidy's second claim of free speech. 
9. In October of 1992, Mr. Cassidy was notified by the 
department that he had not been selected for the captain 
position. R. 277, f3. He was told that the fire department had 
mistakenly failed to schedule his and Jeff Miles' interview. R. 
277, 53/ Transcript, p. 101, 1. 9-22.3 Both were informed that 
3Salt Lake County Firefighter Policy 2150.3.2.2 provides that if a 
firefighter has not been interviewed for the position within the last 90 days, 
he/she must be re-interviewed. 
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the prior promotion was canceled and the department would correct 
its error and schedule interviews. Transcript, p. 102, 1. 11-24. 
Mr. Cassidy was also informed that Mr. Cooper would not be 
removed from his appointment to captain. R. 277, 55. At the 
time of the promotion of Mr. Cooper, Mr. Cassidy had the highest 
ranking. R. 74. 
10. In October of 1992, Cassidy was promoted to position of 
Hazardous Material Firefighter with an increase in pay. R. 37, 
51; Transcript, p. 175, 1. 9-16, 24-25. 
11. Pursuant to the department's error in not interviewing 
Cassidy for captain, an interview was scheduled during November 
of 1992. Shortly after the interview had commenced, it was 
discovered that Cassidy had secreted a tape recorder on himself. 
R. 263, 56. 
12. After the interview in November, Mr. Cassidy filed a 
grievance with the F.C.S.C. alleging a tainted interview process. 
Transcript, p. 115, 1. 20-25; p. 289, 1. 7-20. 
13. During December of 1992, a second interview board was 
created as a result of another captain's vacancy. The fire chief 
removed himself from the second board because of the allegations 
by appellant. Mr. Cassidy was interviewed, along with George 
Painter, Mont Cooper and Jeff Miles. R. 263, 56. 
14. The interview board recommended retaining Mont Cooper 
as a captain and promoting George Painter. R. 263, 58. 
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15. The Fire Chief, Larry Hinman, followed the board's 
recommendation. The fire chief was concerned with Mr. Cassidy's 
ability to follow fire department policy, his ability to fill the 
position of captain, and passed him over for promotion. The fire 
department believed Mont Cooper and George Painter were more 
qualified than the appellant. R. 263, 59; Transcript, p. 216; p. 
96, 1. 14-24. 
16. Pursuant to Mr. Cassidy's grievance, the F.C.S.C. ruled 
on April 23, 1993, that it lacked jurisdiction or authority over 
the fire department's hiring and promotion grievances. R. 264, 
510. 
17. Mr. Cassidy appealed the decision of the F.C.S.C. to 
the Third District Court. On October 31, 1994, Judge Timothy 
Hanson ruled that the F.C.S.C. did have jurisdiction and remanded 
the matter to the F.C.S.C. to render an appropriate decision. R. 
264, 512. 
18. On April 11, 1995, the F.C.S.C. ruled that the fire 
department did not violate Cassidy's statutory or constitutional 
rights by failing to promote him. R. 264, 513. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The failure of Mr. Cassidy to name as an indispensable 
party, the fire chief of Salt Lake County, prevents the Court 
from granting the relief requested. Substantial evidence exists 
in the record that supports the F.C.S.C. and the lower court's 
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decision, which Cassidy has failed to marshal. No adverse 
employment action has been suffered by Cassidy. His rights of 
free speech did not rise to the level of public concern and 
assuming his criticism was of a public concern, there were 
sufficient reasons for his nonpromotion. Additionally, Cassidy's 
claim of retaliation for violating the Salt Lake County 
whistleblower ordinance is not supported by the record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY FIRE CHIEF IS A 
NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THIS 
ACTION. 
Under Utah law a party must first be determined to be a 
necessary party under Rule 19(a) of the Utah R. Civ. P. before 
the issue of indispensability is reached under Rule 19(b). 
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P. 2d 941 (Utah App. 1989), 
aff'd sub nom. Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1990). Rule 19(a) requires that a person be joined as a party 
if: 
. . .(1) in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) he claims an interest re-
lating to the subject of the action and 
is so situated that the disposition of 
the action in his absence may: (i) as 
a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest . . . 
Chapter 28 of Title 17 of the Utah Code (the "Statute") and 
the Fire Civil Service Policies promulgated thereunder regulate 
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the Fireman's Civil Service System. The Statute was amended in 
1992, to provide for the establishment of the Council, the 
adoption of fire rules and policies, the appointment of an 
Executive Director ("Executive Director"), the certification of 
eligible appointees from promotional registers, the procedure in 
disciplinary matters and their appeals to the District Court. 
The Fire Civil Service is required by Section 17-28-2.6 to be 
administered in a manner consistent with merit principles. 
Pursuant to Section 17-28-6, Utah Code Ann. (1992), the Executive 
Director, who is appointed by the legislative body, has the 
exclusive authority to: 
(a) exercise, on behalf of the county, 
executive or administrative duties regarding 
the management and administration of the 
County Fire Civil Service System, . . . 
including . . . administration of 
examinations, classification of duties, 
preparation of hiring registers, . . . 
(b) classify persons successfully 
passing examinations in the order of their 
ascertained merit and prepare a list of them; 
Additionally, the Executive Director certifies persons as 
eligible for appointment as firefighters pursuant to Section 17-
28-7 and 17-28-10. The process for certification of eligible 
appointees is set forth in §§17-28-9 and 17-28-8, which provide: 
(1) The fire chief of each county fire 
department shall notify the . . . executive 
director of all positions to be filled . . . 
[executive director] shall . . . certify from 
. . . register to the head of the fire 
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department the appropriate number of persons, 
. . . . Utah Code Annotated §17-28-9(1). 
After the Executive Director certifies the appropriate 
number, eligible candidates are then appointed pursuant to 
Section 17-28-8 as follows: 
The fire chief of each fire department of 
counties subject to the provisions of this 
chapter shall, subject to the rules of the 
County Fire Civil Service Council, appoint from 
the certified . • . register, all persons necessary 
to fill all firefighter civil service positions in 
the county fire department. 
The involvement of the F.C.S.C. in this promotional process 
is very limited and is specifically set forth in §§17-28-8 and 
17-28-9. Section 17-28-9 provides that appointees shall be 
placed on probation as prescribed by Council rules. Section 17-
28-8 provides that the appointment from the register prepared and 
certified by the Executive Director may be subject to the rules 
of the Council. However, any rules adopted by the Council may 
not be contrary to or supersede the specific powers and duties of 
the Executive Director. With the exception of the limited powers 
and duties noted above, the F.C.S.C. is not otherwise empowered 
to act in connection with hiring or promotional matters, which is 
reserved to the Executive Director and the Fire Chief. 
Mr. Cassidy, in his prayer for relief, asks the lower court 
and now this Court to promote him to captain with back pay from 
February of 1992. 
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Courts generally can make a legally binding adjudication 
only between the parties actually joined in the action. Hiltsey 
v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1025 n.2 (Utah 1987) [holding that under 
Rule 19(b), "no judgment could have been so entered for the 
reason that the corporation was not before the court." (quoting 
R.M.S. Corp. v. Baldwin, 576 P.2d 881, 893 (Utah 1978))]. 
Werner-Jacobsen v. Bednarik, 327 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 5 (Utah App. 
1997). In this case, the fire chief was not a party before the 
lower court and no attempt was made by Mr. Cassidy to join him. 
To award any relief to Mr. Cassidy, the fire chief must be a 
party to the action because complete relief cannot be accorded 
without him. Only the fire chief can promote Mr. Cassidy. The 
fire chief is the real party in interest and any judgment would 
be prejudicial without his presence as a party. The F.C.S.C. 
raised this issue in its answer and before the lower court. 
Additionally, any party may raise the issue of the failure to 
join an indispensable party at any time in the proceedings, 
including the first time on appeal. Seftel, 765 P.2d at 945. 
Therefore, this appeal should be dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE LOWER COURT'S 
RULING UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE FIRE 
CIVIL SERVICE COUNCIL. 
The Salt Lake County F.C.S.C. findings of fact must be 
upheld if they are supported by "substantial evidence when viewed 
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in light of the whole record before the court." Grace Drilling 
Co. v. Bd. of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). 
Before the findings of the F.C.S.C. are subjected to the 
substantial evidence test, the party challenging the findings 
"must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and 
show that despite the supporting facts, the . . . findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence." id. at 68. 
Mr. Cassidy has failed to marshal the facts that show the 
lower court's findings were supported by substantial evidence. 
He asserts that the facts do not support the findings that he 
carried his concerns far beyond his right to address a public 
concern [Finding No. 23, R. 281]; that his comments affected the 
efficiency of the department [Finding No. 23. R. 282]; and that 
there was no showing that Mr. Cassidy was denied a promotion to 
captain based upon his criticism of the wildland fire crew. 
[Finding No. 29, R. 282.] 
Mr. Cassidy failed to marshal the following facts. At the 
same time he complained of an adverse action, he was promoted by 
the fire chief to a hazardous materials technician. R. 37, fl. 
Mr. Cassidy was advised by his attorney, Dave Thomas, that the 
upcoming interview was a sham with people involved who could not 
be trusted. He advised Mr. Cassidy to wear a concealed tape 
recorder in order to provide an accurate record. R. 282, 52 6; 
Transcript at p. 183, 1. 7-20. After the tape recording started 
making noises, the chief told Cassidy he was disloyal to the 
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administration. Transcript at p. 180, 1. 5-25. Cassidy was also 
told that he was neither supportive of administration nor the 
mission of the fire department. Transcript at p. 146, 1. 1-5; p. 
216, 1. 23-25. Cassidy had made derogatory comments that the 
chief could not be trusted. Transcript at p. 108, 1. 171-19. 
Cassidy deliberately went against directives from his supervisor. 
R. 282, 527; Transcript at p. 235, 1. 14-25; p. 236, 1. 1-16; p. 
238, 1. 11-15. 
The fire chief had conversations with each candidate's 
captain to see how they viewed the performance of firefighters on 
promotional registers. Transcript at p. 210, 1. 15-19. The 
chief viewed Cassidy's performance as substandard. Transcript at 
p. 210, 1. 10-14. Captain Collins, Cassidy's supervisor, felt 
Cassidy continually undermined his authority. Transcript at p. 
238, 1. 11-12; his orders were countermanded; for example, 
"Cassidy refused to wear his combat boots at all times except for 
physical activity." Transcript at p. 235, 1. 14-25; p. 236, 1. 
1-16. If any controversial issue in the fire department arose, 
Cassidy would jump in. Transcript at p. 238, 1. 1-6; Cassidy 
failed to follow orders at drill tower evaluation. Transcript at 
p. 238, 1. 16-25; p. 239 1. 1-16. Cassidy was considered a 
marginal firefighter by his captain. His captain was critical of 
his action at the fire scene; he was the first to take off his 
air pack and first to leave. Transcript at p. 249, 1. 13-21. 
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Because Cassidy failed to marshal the evidence, this Court 
should assume the record supports the findings and proceed to 
review the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law. 
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993). The 
F.C.S.C. found ample evidence to support the fire department's 
position that no adverse action was taken against Mr. Cassidy, 
nor was his right of free speech violated. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT HAS NOT SUFFERED AN ADVERSE 
EMPLOYMENT ACTION AND THEREFORE HIS FIRST 
AMENDMENT CLAIM IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
In order for Cassidy to prevail on his First Amendment 
claim, he must demonstrate that he has suffered an adverse 
retaliatory employment action motivated by the exercise of his 
right to free speech. Pickering v. Bd of Education, 391 U.S. 
563, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1969). Numerous cases have limited this 
broad dictate. The speech must be on a matter of public concern. 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 75 L.Ed. 2d 708 (1983). The 
employee's interest in the speech must outweigh governmental 
concerns of running an efficient and productive office. 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. And the complained-of action must be 
sufficiently adverse to present a potential or actual danger that 
the speech of employees will be chilled. Rutan v. Republican 
Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 73-74, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990). A 
retaliatory employment action can take the form of a demotion, 
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diminished responsibility, termination or false accusations. 
Dahm v. Flynn, 60 F.3d 253 (7th Cir. 1994). See also, 
DeGuiseppee v. Village of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187 (7th Cir. 1995). 
The adverse retaliatory action must be material or, in other 
words, the changes in employee employment conditions must be more 
disruptive than a mere inconvenience or alteration of job 
responsibility. Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 
F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) . The change must be sufficiently 
adverse that the employee is made worse off by it. DeGuiseppee, 
68 F.3d at 192. In this case, no retaliatory action was taken by 
the department. Cassidy was not given a written warning, 
transferred, demoted, or fired. In fact, he was promoted by the 
fire chief at that same time he was asserting the fire department 
failed to give him a hearing in October of 1992.4 
The facts showed that he filed his grievance in 1990, 
concerning the proper procedure for dealing with minor violations 
of the Fire Code. R. 114. Mr. Cassidy exercised his rights to 
contest the change before the F.C.S.C. without any adverse 
actions by his employer. R. 281, 522. Over two years expired 
from the time he filed his complaint over the change of procedure 
in enforcing the Fire Code and this cause of action. Clearly, 
the lapse of time weakens the argument that a retaliatory action 
was taken by the department. Cassidy's next complaint came after 
4See R. 277, 11. 
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the announcement of captain promotions in February of 1992, when 
he was not selected. In the spring of 1992, he alleged the 
wildland fire crew was illegal. This speech occurred more than 
six months prior to the present action being filed. Again, no 
adverse action was taken by the fire department. Contrary to the 
assertion of retaliation, Cassidy was promoted in October of 
1992. In addition, no formal charge was ever made by Mr. 
Cassidy; only the threat of some type of legal action to be 
taken. Transcript, p. 197, 1. 11-12. 
The Court in Dahm, 60 F.3d at 257, citing Smith v. Fruin, 28 
F.3d 646, 649 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994), stated: "A materially adverse 
change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a 
demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less 
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly 
diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might 
be unique to a particular situation." None of the above can be 
shown to have been directed to Cassidy. 
Mr. Cassidy has forgotten that his actions of secreting a 
tape recorder during his interview, coupled with his expressed 
distrust of the fire chief and his marginal performance, played 
an important role in the chief s belief that he was not as 
qualified as those promoted. R. 282, 5126. Therefore, since 
Mr. Cassidy did not suffer a material adverse action, he cannot 
demonstrate a First Amendment violation. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S SPEECH WAS NOT OF A PUBLIC 
CONCERN. 
Assuming arguendo, that Mr. Cassidy has suffered from an 
adverse retaliatory action, this Court then determines if his 
speech is a matter of public concern. Connick v. Meyers, 461 
U.S. 138, 147; 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Mt. 
Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 
50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) . In order to make the determination of 
public concern, the court considers the content, form and context 
of the speech. "In order for a public employee's speech to be of 
^public concern,' . . . it is not always enough that Athe subject 
matter could in [certain] circumstances [be] the topic of a 
communication to the public that might be of a general interest.' 
What is actually said on that topic must itself be of public 
concern." Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1317 n.l (10th Cir. 
1986). See also, Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1445 
(10th Cir. 1988). Mr. Cassidy has not sought to inform the 
public that the fire department was not discharging its 
governmental responsibilities in the suppression of fires. Nor 
has he sought to bring to light actual or alleged wrongdoing or 
breach of public trust on the part of the fire chief or the 
department. He has merely challenged an ordinary change in 
procedure and criticized the formation of the wildland fire crew 
within the department. What is actually said on the topic is the 
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crux of the public concern, not the topic itself.5 For instance, 
in Juraensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 888 (4th Cir. 
1984), the court held that the release of internal police audit 
reports to the press, which detailed working conditions 
grievances but did not expose any illegality, abuse of authority, 
corruption or waste, was not on matter of public concern. 
The fire department's responsibility for fire prevention and 
suppression is of public concern; however, Cassidy's grievance 
and subsequent criticism did not attempt to inform the public of 
an issue of public concern. His speech was motivated by his 
personal interest and not a desire to inform the public of 
wrongdoing or inefficiency on the part of the fire department. 
In sum, considering the content, form and context of appellant's 
speech, it did not rise to the level of public concern, and 
therefore is not protected. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT'S SPEECH DOES NOT OUTWEIGH THE FIRE 
DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROMOTING 
EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC SERVICE. 
The protections of the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment extend to all citizens. U.S. Const, amend. I. Though 
a public employee does not lose his right to free speech by 
becoming a public employee, not all restraint is unreasonable. 
5The Connick test requires the court to look at the point of the speech. 
What was the employee's motive? Was the point to further a purely private 
interest? Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir. 1987). 
19 
Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 
L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). In applying the balancing test of Pickering, 
"The state has interests as an employer in regulating the speech 
of its employees . . . a balance between the interest of the [a 
public employee], as a citizen . . . [when] commenting on matters 
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, 
in promoting the efficiency of the public services." Id. at 568 
(insert added). 
The first prong of the Pickering balancing test is whether 
the employee's speech can be "fairly characterized as 
constituting speech on a matter of public concern." Connick, 461 
U.S. at 146 (Appellee's Point IV). The second prong of the 
Pickering/Connick test focuses on the governmental interest in 
the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities 
to the public through its employees, "because the employer should 
not be forced to allow events to unfold to the extent that the 
disruption of the office and the destruction of working 
relationships is manifest before taking action." Connick, 461 
U.S. at 150. Like the determination of whether Cassidy's speech 
was of a public concern, the court looks at the time, place, and 
the manner of the communication to determine whether appellant's 
right of free speech outweighs the interests of the fire 
department. 
Applying the time, place and manner test to Cassidy's two 
instances of speech demonstrates that he enjoyed challenging the 
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directives of his superiors and he believed that administration 
was "stupid." Transcript, p. 239, 1 21-24; p. 240, 1. 1-3. 
Cassidy's initial concern was a minor change in how fire 
code violations would be handled by the fire department. He 
exercised his right to present a grievance through the chain of 
command to the F.C.S.C. It was not the fact that he complained 
through the merit system, but the manner in which he complained. 
Cassidy went to the fire chief's superior, outside of the 
grievance procedure, in an attempt to have the fire chief's 
decision influenced. Transcript, p. 216, 1. 10-18. In Cassidy's 
second claim of free speech, he threatened some action against 
the fire department for creating the wildland crew. Transcript, 
p. 197, 1. 4-8. The place of his speech was the deputy chief's 
office and his fire station, which resulted in contentious 
relations with his co-workers. Again, it was the manner and the 
place of his complaint that does not outweigh the fire 
department's interest in providing effective fire protection to 
the public. Also, it should be noted that in regards to the 
"time" of his complaint, his first complaint occurred more than 
two years before this action, and his second complaint, more than 
six months. 
The fire department must maintain a work environment 
conducive to its mission. Those interests are: "(1) the need to 
maintain discipline or harmony among co-workers; (2) the need for 
21 
confidentiality; (3) the need to curtail conduct which impedes 
the [employees] proper and competent performance of his daily 
duties; and (4) the need to encourage a close and personal 
relationship between the employee and his superiors, where that 
relationship calls for loyalty and confidence." Clark v. Holmes 
474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972) . 
The government has a great interest in effective and 
efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public. As 
a matter of good judgment, the First Amendment does not require a 
municipality to be run as a round table for employee complaints 
over internal office affairs. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. This is 
particularly true in the case of the fire department. The 
operation of police and fire departments differs greatly from 
other public employment groups. H.J. Shewmake v. Bd. Of Fire and 
Police Comm'rs of the Village of East Alton, 390 N.E.2d 536, 539 
(111. Ct. App. 5th District, 1979). Some dissension in a fire 
department is certain to arise. Discipline may be imposed as 
necessary to avoid adverse effects to the public interests. 
Klein v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Cedar Rapids, 152 N.W.2d 195, 200 
(Iowa 1967). 
Because of the nature of firefighting, and 
its high stakes, operational efficiency and 
harmony among co-workers are critical. Where 
a fireman, motivated by resentment, 
bitterness, and self-aggrandizement, engages 
in disruptive conduct intending to undermine 
the authority of department officers, the 
speech accompanying such conduct is not 
constitutionally protected. Bickel v. 
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Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 
1990). 
Where appellant challenged his captain's directives to such 
extent t h a t h i s f e J ] : \ i C O w o r k e r s t a k e a c t i • i:» n [ T r a n s c x: :i p t, p . 
236]; that they do not want to work with him [Transcript, p. 241, 
1. 1-3], affects the efficiency of the fire department. The fire 
chief lacked confidence in the appellant to follow office policy 
and recognized that Cassidy's behavior had created a problem with 
his supervisor and co-workers. The decision to promote other 
candidates was based on the belief they were better candidates. 
Tin is 1 1] : Cassid^ > J s :i : :i gl i t t : • • = xpress 1 limseJ f does i i- :)t : i iti leigl I 
the fire department's responsibility to perform efficiently for 
the pi; ib] i • :: 
POINT VT 
APPELLANT WOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED A PROMOT ' ON 
TO CAPTAIN EVEN IF HIS SPEECH WA? - ROTEC" 
Undr - .-,L. Healthy, -
Mr. Cassidy cannot recover if it can be established by a 
r^enonderance of the evidence that he woi ild have been den j ed 
promotion even in the absence of the protected conduct: The 
facts, as determined by the F.C.S.C. and the lower court, amply 
d emo i i s t r a t e 11 I a b C a s s i d y s p r onto t :i o i i i , D I :i ] :i 1 I a v e bee i i de n i e d even 
absent any protected conduct. More specifically, his actions and 
d i s r up t i ^  r e i i a I: i 11: • a ; ; :i 1:1 :i :i i I t: 1: I • = f :i i : = s 1: a 1: i : • i I , c :::»up 1 e i i ,; :i f: 1 i 1 i :i s 
attempt to set up the fire department with his concealed tape 
recorder, reflected a disloyal attitude. 
Under the analysis of the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy, and 
applied by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bickel v. 
Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1980), Mr. Cassidy cannot 
prevail on his free speech claims. The Bickel court held that 
the plaintiff fireman's right to recover for an adverse action of 
nonpromotion was conditioned upon (1) showing that he was not 
promoted because of the remarks he made to his superiors and 
(2) that his remarks were constitutionally protected. In 
addition, (3) if the defendant established by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that plaintiff would have been denied a promotion 
even in the absence of the protected conduct, the plaintiff could 
not recover. Bickel, 632 F.2d at 1255.6 In this circumstance, 
the fire department is a paramilitary organization which requires 
esprit de corps not only between its rank and file but between 
firefighters and their supervisors. When lives may be at stake 
in a fire, an esprit de corps is essential to the success of the 
joint endeavor. "Carping, criticism and abrasive conduct has no 
place in an organization that depends upon common loyalty, and 
harmony among coworkers." Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer 
Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2nd Cir. 1979), citing Pickering, 
391 U.S. at 570. 
6It should be rioted that in Bickel, the fire chief was a party to the 
action, unlike the case at hand. 
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Appellant's criticism of the administration of the fire 
d e p a r tme n t , h :i s a. 11 ernp t s t : i 11 i d e rm i n € 1: :i i s c a p t a i n , a n d h i s 
attempt to set up the department with a secreted tape recorder 
clearly demonstrate that Mr. Cassidy was disruptive to the fire 
department and not qualified for the position of captain. 
POINT VT * 
T H E R E C 0 R D D ( ) E S N Q T S u J _ _ 
WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIM. 
Mr. Cassidy cites for the first time on appeal that his 
conduct was protected under Salt Lake County's whistleblower 
ordinance, Section 2.80.11 0.A., and cites a portion thereof. 
Generally, an issue must be expressly 
preserved [in the proceedings] below to 
warrant appellate consideration. State v. 
Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271, 273 n.4 (Utah App. 
1995), [citing State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 
360 (Utah App. 1993)] . 
Failure to preserve the issue in the agency proceedings bars 
the coui t• s coi isider a tioi I : f 11 Ie issue c • i i appeal. See, Lamb v. 
B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 931 (Utah 1993). See also, 
F i; i ] e 2 4 o f t h e I J1: a 1: :i F : i :i ] e s c f P, p p e ] I a t e E r o c e di i r e i , 1: :i i c 1: I r e qu i res 
Cassidy's brief to contain a citation to the record showing the 
issue was preserved i n the agency proceedings. Mr. Cassidy first 
raised the protection of the whistleblower ordinance in his Reply 
Memorandum of January 8, 1997 (R. 233) as an additional argument 
that his First Amendment rights were violated. 
Subparagraph B. of Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances 
2.80.110 does not extend the protection of the ordinance to 
employees for proper and justified personnel actions that were 
not taken for retaliatory purposes. 
Nowhere in Mr. Cassidy's grievance before the F.C.S.C. or 
his Complaint in the lower court does he allege a violation of 
Salt Lake County ordinance 2.80.110.A. Mr. Cassidy's counsel 
contended then, as now, that the actions by the fire chief 
violated his First Amendment rights and Utah Code Ann. 17-28-2.6. 
The Court should not consider facts which are not supported by 
and cited to the record. See Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. 
Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). Failure to cite pages in the 
record should result in a finding upholding the decision below. 
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987). In 
conclusion, Mr. Cassidy's assertion of a violation of the 
whistleblower ordinance was not raised below and not supported by 
the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, appellee, Salt Lake County Fire 
Civil Service Commission, respectfully requests that the Court 
affirm the decision of the lower court. 
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I I I I I I I I I I 
Rule 19. Jo inder of persons needed for just adjudica-
tion. 
(ai Persons to be jo ined if feasible. A person who m 
subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive 
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall 
be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and 
is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence 
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already 
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his 
claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall 
order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff 
but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a 
proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party 
objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the 
action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determinat ion by cour t whenever j o inde r no t fea-
sible. If a person as described in Subdivision (aXlM2) hereof 
cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in 
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among 
the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be 
considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judg-
ment rendered in the person s absence might be prejudicial to 
him or those already parties; second, -the extent to which, by 
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, 
or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided: 
third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an 
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
(c) P leading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading assert-
ing a claim for relief shall state the names, if known to the 
pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision (a)(lM2) 
hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not 
joined 
(d) Exception ot class act ions. Ihi... rule is subject lu the 
provisions of Rule 23. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
617 COUNTIES 17-28-12 
benefits as a full-time employee and who is hired to 
suppress wildland fires in areas outside of inhabited, 
urban areas. 1997 
17-28-6. County Fire Civil Service executive directoi 
— Powers and duties. 
(1) (a) Within each county subject to this chapter, there is 
created the office of executive director of County Fire Civil 
Service, who shall be appointed by the county legislative 
body. 
(b) The executive director shall be a person with proven 
experience in personnel management and shall be ac-
countable to the county legislative body for his perfor-
mance in office. 
(c) The position of executive director shall be a merit 
position under Title 17, Chapter 33, County Personnel 
Management Act, and shall be recruited and selected in 
the same manner as the holders of other career service 
merit positions, with the concurrence of the County Fire 
Civil Service Council. 
(2) The County Fire Civil Service executive director shall: 
(a) exercise, on behalf of the county, executive or ad-
ministrative duties regarding the management and ad-
ministration of the County Fire Civil Service System, 
r
 including the management and administration of exami-
nations, classification of duties, preparation of hiring 
*~ registers, recommendations regarding civil service regu-
lations and policies, and other duties provided in this 
chapter; 
(b) classify persons successfully passing examinations 
in the order of their ascertained merit and prepare a list 
of them; 
(c) make certification of classifications when required; 
(d) make, publish, and distribute necessary rules rela-
tive to examinations, classifications, and certifications as 
may be proper and desirable in the administration of this 
chapter; 
(e) establish and maintain records of employees in the 
County Fire Civil Service System setting forth as to each 
employee class, title, pay, status, and other relevant data; 
(f) make necessary and proper reports to the County 
Fire Civil Service Council, the fire chief, or the county 
legislative body; 
(g) apply and carry out the provisions of this chapter 
^ and the policies and rules adopted under it; and 
(h) perform other lawful acts that may be necessary or 
desirable to carry out the purposes of this chapter. 
(3) The executive director shall appoint the members of and 
act as chair to a County Fire Civil Service Advisory Committee 
t which shall assist the executive director in making recommen-
tdatdons to the county legislative body regarding County Fire 
Cjvil Service System rules and policies. 1992 
% 
-28-7. Examinations. 
XI) A person may not be appointed to any civil service 
fposition as a firefighter in any fire department subject to the 
^Provisions of this chapter until he has successfully passed an 
k lamination and been certified as eHgible for consideration by 
J** County Fire Civil Service executive director, except that 
ftojr honorably discharged veteran of the United States mili-
J*jy service shall receive preferential employment consider-
iJfion for entry into the County Fire Civil Service System. 
B[(2) All examinations shall be public, competitive, and free 
3gd fairly test the ability of persons to discharge the duties of 
Exposition. 1992 
Eligible appointees to tire department. 
- fire chief of each fire department of counties subject to 
* provisions of this chapter shall, subject to the rules of the 
r
 Fire Civil Service Council, appoint from the certified 
county fire civil service register, all persons necessary to fill all 
firefighter civil service positions in the county fire department. 
1992 
I  I I Certification of eligible appointees — Proba-
tionary period. 
(1) The fire chief of each county fire department shall notify 
the County Fire Civil Service executive director of all positions 
to be filled in his department when the need arises. The 
County Fire Civil Service executive director shall then, as 
soon as possible, certify from the certified county fire civil 
service register to the head of the fire department the appro-
priate number of persons, consistent with adopted rules. 
(2) Appointments from the certified register shall be placed 
on probation under conditions and for a period as prescribed 
by County Fire Civil Service Council rules. 1991 
17-28-10. Vacancies in civil service positions. 
Any vacancy occurring in any county fire civil service 
position in any county fire department subject to this chapter 
shall be filled by an employee of the department having a 
lesser, equal, or superior position than that in which the 
vacancy occurs if that employee submits himself to examina-
tion for the position, is found qualified, and is certified by the 
County Fire Civil Service executive director as provided in 
this chapter. i w 
17-28-11. Temporary work — Term or period. 
The head of any county fire department coming within the 
provisions of this act may with the advice and consent of the 
county legislative body, appoint to any position or place of 
employment in his fire department, any person for temporary 
work without making such appointment from the certified 
civil service list, provided, however, such appointment shall 
not be longer than one month in the aggregate in the same 
calendar year. 1993 
17-28-12. Removal from office and disciplinary action 
— Appeals — Hearing and determination 
Findings. 
(1) Any person holding a position under this chapter may be 
removed from office or employment, reduced in rank or grade, 
or otherwise disciplined by the fire chief for misconduct, 
incompetency, failure to perform the duties of his employment 
or to properly observe the rules of the office or department in 
which he is employed, or for other cause, as set out in County 
Fire Civil Service Council rules. 
(2) Any such disciplinary action is subject to appeal in all 
cases by the aggrieved party to the County Fire Civil Service 
Council in the manner established by rule. After an appeal is 
filed the council shall, as soon as practicable, hear and 
determine the matter. 
(3) If it determines that it is in the best interest of the 
county, the county legislative body may appoint an adminis-
trative law judge, trained and experienced in personnel mat-
ters, to initially hear the matter. Upon hearing, the adminis-
trative law judge shall make findings of fact and a 
recommendation to the council. The council may adopt or 
reject the recommendation of the administrative law judge or 
request that the judge hold further factual hearings prior to 
the council's decision. 
(4) The council may then affirm, modify, vacate, or set aside 
the order for disciplinary action. 
(5) The aggrieved party shall, upon demand, be granted a 
public hearing, at which he may appear in person or by 
counsel or both. 
(6) After the hearing, the findings and determination of the 
County Fire Civil Service Council shall be certified to the head 
of the county fire department from whose order the appeal is 
taken. Notice in writing of the determination shall be served 
upon the person affected. 
2JJU Report of wrongdoing— 
Protection from retaliation. 
i-i. JLU u unlawful for any person to coerce any 
employee into undertaking an illegal, unethical or 
improper act, or to take any retaliatory action 
against any employee because of that employee's 
disclosure of information relating to county govern-
ment mismanagement, corruption, misuse or waste 
of funds, abuse of authority, substantial and specific 
danger to public health or safety, or other wrongdo-
ing in violation of the law. 
B. Any employee who refuses to obey an illegal 
instruction or who discloses information concerning 
county government mismanagement, corruption, 
misuse or waste of funds, abuse of authority, sub-
stantial and specific danger to public health or safe-
ty, or other wrongdoing in violation of the law with 
a reasonable, good-faith belief that such refusal is 
justified or that such disclosures are true and accu-
rate shall be protected from any retaliatory or coer-
cive personnel action. This provision does not ex-
tend to any protection for employees from otherwise 
proper and justified personnel actions taken for 
disciplinary or budgetary reasons and not for retalia-
tory purposes. A "personnel action" means any 
administrative act or omission which adversely 
affects an employee's grade, personnel evaluation, 
salary or working conditions, or changes the 
employee's duties or responsibilities inconsistent 
with the employee's grade and salary. 
C. Employees are encouraged and directed to 
report to appropriate agencies or officials instances 
of possible county government mismanagement, 
conuption, misuse or waste of funds, abuse of au-
thority, substantial and specific danger to public 
health or safety, or other wrongdoings in violation 
of the law. If such a report is filed with a county 
department, official or agency, the identity of the 
employee filing the report shall be kept confidential 
unless this right is waived in writing by the employ-
ee. 
D. Any persoi i maj fill z a c amplaii it :hargii ig a 
violation of this section I he boar el :: I: :ount> cc m-
missioners shall also have authority, with or without 
a complaint, to initiate an inquiry of any county 
official or employee suspected of taking retaliatory 
or coercive personnel action against an employee as 
prohibited by this section, 
E f\ny person violating subsections A and B of 
this section shall be guilty of a Class B misdemean-
or and upon conviction shall be punished as set 
forth in Chapter 1.12 of this code. In addition, the 
board of county commissioners, in accordance with 
policies and procedures and under the provisions of 
Title 17, Chapter 33, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
may: 
1. Revoke or modify any personnel action found 
to be taken in violation of this section; 
2 Direct the appointing authority to reduce in. 
grad, si ispend or remove any county merit system 
employee found in violation of this section; 
3. Recommend to the appointing authority ap-
propriate sanctions concerning any appointed county 
official or employee who is not a merit system 
employee and who is found, in i riolation of this 
section; 
Report in the case of an elected official, its 
findings to the appropriate state or local agency 
having jurisdiction over the conduct involved; 
5. Release the report to the public; or 
6. Temporarily suspend any personnel action 
pending a full inquiry by the board into charges of 
violation of this section. (1986 Recodification; Old 
848 § 1. 1983: prior code § 1-5-11) 
